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1
 
 
CONTRACT LAW- INDEMNITY PROVISIONS 
  
Summary 
 
 An appeal regarding contract language’s effect on an indemnitor’s duty to indemnify and 
defend an indemnitee in a personal injury action where the language provides that 
indemnification will occur “to the extent” that any injury or damage is “caused” by the 
indemintor.  
 
Disposition 
 
 The contractual indemnity language imposed a causal limitation on United Rentals’ duty 
to indemnify. Therefore, United Rentals did not have a duty to indemnify or defend Wells Cargo 
because the jury found that United Rentals did not proximately cause the underlying accident.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Wells Cargo, upon entering into a contract with Howard Hughes Corporation
2
 as a 
general contractor for a road improvement project, contracted United Rentals to assist with 
traffic control. The contract between United Rentals and Wells Cargo included this indemnity 
provision: 
 The Subcontractor . . . shall indemnify, defend and hold the General 
Contractor [and] Owner . . . harmless from and against all claims . . . pertaining 
to the performance of the Subcontract and involving personal injury . . . to the 
extent caused in whole or in part by the negligent acts or omissions or other fault 
of the Subcontractor . . . . This indemnification agreement is binding on the 
Subcontractor . . . regardless of whether any or all of the persons and entities 
indemnified hereunder are responsible in part for the claims, damages, losses or 
expenses for which the Subcontractor . . . is obligated to provide indemnification.  
 
 Antonette Kodera was driving her motorcycle when she hit an unmarked bump in the 
road, crashed and sustained serious injuries. She filed a complaint against Howard Hughes 
Corporation and Wells Cargo, later amending her complaint to include United Rentals, alleging 
negligence in not marking the bump as dangerous, failing to provide appropriate warning of its 
presence, and/or failing to remove the hazardous condition that caused her injuries.  
 Wells Cargo tendered its defense to United Rentals and an insurance carrier for United 
Rentals, both of which went unanswered. Wells Cargo then cross-claimed United Rentals for 
contribution, equitable indemnity, express or contractual indemnity, and breach of contract; 
United Rentals denied liability in their answer.  
 The district court ordered United Rentals to indemnify Wells Cargo unless Wells Cargo 
or Howard Hughes Corporation was determined to be solely negligent. The court held United 
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 Not party to appeal. 
Rentals to be obligated to defend and hold harmless Wells Cargo, for the entirety of the suit, 
irrespective of a determination of liability because the obligation is not outcome determinative.  
 Wells Cargo, Howard Hughes Corporation and co-defendant the Nevada Department of 
Transportation reached a settlement agreement with Kodera for $1,000,000. United Rentals 
succeeded at jury trial against Kodera where they were found to be negligent, but not a 
proximate cause of her injuries. Wells Cargo used this jury finding when filing for 
indemnification, asserting the jury’s determination of United Rentals’ negligence showed Wells 
Cargo was not solely negligent. United Rentals again opposed, stating that indemnification was 
contingent on them being the cause of Kodera’s damages, which was negated by the jury’s 
verdict.  
 The district court held Wells Cargo only needed to show potential liability when it 
tendered its defense to United Rentals, and because it did, their tendered defense was done 
seasonably and United Rentals had an obligation to indemnify regardless of outcome. The 
district court concluded United Rentals showed no evidence suggesting a lack of potential 
liability and granted the motion to enforce indemnification on behalf of Wells Cargo. The district 
court also awarded Wells Cargo an amended judgment for $1,000,000 plus interest for the 
settlement and $424,782.87 in attorney fees.  United Rentals appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Justice Hardesty wrote the opinion of the court, with Justices Saitta and Pickering 
concurring. This court views interpretation of an indemnity clause within a contract as a question 
of law, and subjects it to de novo review.
3
 Also, this court subjects the challenge of a grant of 
summary judgment to de novo review, without deference to the district court’s findings.4 The 
court does not generally subject contractual duties to indemnify to equitable considerations, but 
enforces it “in accordance with the terms of the contracting parties’ agreement.”5 
 
I. United Rentals’ duty to indemnify Wells Cargo is limited to the extent United Rentals 
caused the damages 
 
 The Court focused on the language in the contract that stated United Rentals shall 
indemnify “to the extent caused in whole or in part by the negligent acts or omissions or other 
fault of [United Rentals].” United Rentals argued, and the Court agreed, that a plain reading of 
the contract placed an obligation on United Rentals to indemnify to the extent that it caused the 
underlying accident and related damages. The Court used their conclusion in Reyburn to hold 
that United Rentals’ duty to indemnify is limited to the extent they actually caused the injury.6 In 
Reyburn, the Court held that because an indemnity provision did not explicitly indemnify the 
indemnitee against its own negligence there must be a showing of negligence on the indemnitor’s 
part prior to triggering the duty to indemnify, and the indemnitee will be indemnified only for the 
indemnitor’s negligence.7 The court construed this portion of the clause strictly to be consistent 
                                                        
3
 Reyburn Lawn v. Plaster Development Co., 127 Nev. __, __, 255 P.3d 268, 274 (2011).  
4
 Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 268, 274 (2011).  
5
 Reyburn, 127 Nev. at __, 255 P.3d at 274 (quoting Prince v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 202 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 
2009)).  
6
 255 P.3d at 275.  
7
 Id.  
with its refusal to increase legal obligations of parties where the parties intentionally limited 
them.
8
 
 The court then looked to other jurisdictions that have held limiting a duty to indemnify 
“to the extent” injury was “caused” by the indemintor required a finding of degree of fault on the 
part of the indemnitor. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded, in construing an entire 
indemnity provision, that the “language . . . easily read to only indemnify [the indemnitees] for 
that portion of damages caused by the negligence of the [indemintor].”9 The court also looked to 
cases interpreting similar indemnification language in Arizona
10
 and Minnesota.
11
  
 This Court, consistent with other jurisdictions, held that “to the extent caused” language 
is strictly construed as limiting an indemnitor’s liability to cover the indemnitee’s losses only to 
the extent the injuries were caused by the indemintor. Justice Hardesty concluded that the 
indemnification provision at issue limited United Rental’s duty to indemnify only to the extent 
that it caused Kodera’s accident. He went on to hold that United Rentals was zero percent liable 
because of the jury’s finding that United Rentals was not the proximate cause of Kodera’s 
accident, entitling Wells Cargo to zero indemnification.  
 
II. The district court erred in determining that United Rentals was required to defend 
Wells Cargo and further erred in awarding Wells Cargo attorney fees 
 
 The Court held that United Rentals’ duty to defend was subject to the same “to the extent 
caused” limitation as their duty to indemnify. The Court agreed with United Rentals who argued 
that, “[t]o hold otherwise would force [it] to incur attorney[ ] fees in defense of claims it may not 
have caused, which is contrary to the express language.”  
 The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify because it covers both claims 
under which the indemintor is, and could be, found liable.
12
 The Court held that this broad duty 
to defend, which connotes an obligation of active responsibility,
13
 was not limitless. A duty to 
defend in an indemnification provision is subject to strict construction of the contract language.
14
 
The Court came to this conclusion through Reyburn where it held, “unless specifically otherwise 
stated in the indemnity clause, and indemnitor’s duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those 
claims directly attributed to the indemnitor’s scope of work and does not include defending 
against claims arising from . . . the indemnitee’s own negligence.”15  
 Justice Hardesty reiterated that the Court would not “attempt to increase the legal 
obligations of the parties where the parties intentionally limited such obligations.”16 The Court 
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found no language in the contract directing United Rentals to defend Wells Cargo in claims 
where Wells Cargo’s own negligence is asserted. The Court, in strictly construing the existing 
contractual language, held that United Rentals’ duty to defend was limited “to the extent” that 
United Rentals “caused” Kodera’s accident. It followed then that because the jury found United 
Rentals was not the proximate cause of Kodera’s accident, they had no duty to defend. Further, 
the plain language placing no duty to defend on United Rentals meant the district court erred in 
awarding Wells Cargo defense costs and attorney fees. 
17
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court reversed the decision of the district court, holding that the “to the extent 
caused” language in the indemnification provision, strictly construed, placed duties to indemnify 
and defend on United Rentals only to the extent that it caused Kodera’s injuries. The Court used 
the jury’s determination that United Rentals’ negligence was not the proximate cause of 
Kodera’s injuries to conclude that it owed no duty to indemnify or defend to Wells Cargo.  
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